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Book Review
Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work, by Herman Rapaport, New York: Routledge, 2003, vii+146 pp.
Bibliography and index, ISBN 0-415-94268-3 $85 (hc.), 0-415-94269-1 $19.95 (pbk.).
Herman Rapaport’s latest book is an uneven collection comprising 4 related but self-standing chapters on
Derrida’s recent work. Chapter 1 and chapter 3 had previously appeared in Diacritics in 1995 and 1998,
respectively, the other two chapters are new. The different destinations mark a difference in tone among
the different sections. The chapters that were originally published in Diacritics are written in the typically
compressed, and often allusive, style characteristic of a highly specialized journal in critical theory that
can count on a sophisticated readership. The new material, instead, follows the more relaxed conventions
of book publishing: the chapters are longer, more detailed and, generally speaking, more discursive in
tone. The last chapter, however, seems to have been rushed to the press at the very last moment: it
contains several typos (otherwise absent), and a quite puzzling, verbatim repetition of a full page-long
paragraph (p. 114 and p.117: “Second, if Heidegger attacks...he may have wanted to stay with this
insight”). Lastly, the title of the book may be slightly misleading. “Later Derrida” may prompt the reader
to mistake Rapaport’s book for a rather general and compact introduction to the Derrida’s work after the
so-called “ethical turn” of the 1980s. As the subtitle suggests, Rapaport is more interested in engagement
than exegesis.
The main line of this rich and composite book is constituted by an analysis of the ethical
implications of Derrida’s later work. In keeping with deconstruction’s favorite style, “ethical
implications” must be understood in the sense of the analysis of the often aporetic structure of the
most fundamental concepts of ethics, and not in the sense of developing a normative ethics or
inquiring about the formal structure of a possible ethical system. Thus, large space is devoted to
“responsibility,” “justice,” “hospitality,” “community (Gemeinschaft),” “identity,” etc., all concepts
that have been at the center of Derrida’s recent interests, as well as to “agency,” “freedom,”
“action,” themes that we usually associate with the existentialist tradition that originated with Sartre
and early Heidegger. Considering that deconstruction has been considered as one of the most
decisive and violent oppositions to existentialism and all the other forms of “anthropologisms” (a
term used by Derrida himself in 1972), the critical confrontation lying at the center of Rapaport’s
book could be rather startling. In fact, it is one of the merits of the book to bring to the forefront the
unsettling proximity between deconstruction and its allegedly “surpassed” traditions, and to ask
whether Derrida’s later work has recanted on his more radical, earlier positions; whether the
received view of deconstruction does indeed do justice to a complexity that had perhaps always
been there but went unnoticed in the canonization of the school; or whether, finally, the later
“ethical” turn represents a genuine development of deconstruction’s earlier themes that, under the
powerful influence of Levinas and Blanchot, bends its potentialities into one possible direction
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/franchirev1.html[9/18/2009 5:07:57 PM]
while leaving aside alternative possibilities. While I lean toward the last view, Rapaport seems to
favor the second one. The interest of the book, however, does not lie so much in the final judgment,
which may well be left to the reader, but to the analytic work that brings to the fore such
antagonistic positions.
Indeed, Rapaport’s analysis proceeds, most often, per via negativa. Each chapter sets up a
confrontation between Derrida’s recent work and the contradictory positions stemming from
different traditions, eras, or selves. The first chapter, “Deconstruction’s Other,” explores the
possibility of a “deconstructive” agency and political action by comparing the work of Derrida with
Trinh Min-Ha’s --a thinker who has uninhibitedly reappropriated the metaphysical concepts and
modes thought to be anathema to deconstruction. Similarly, the second, longest, and strongest
chapter, titled “Monolinguism and Literature,” is built around a seemingly bizarre comparison
between Derrida’s conceptions of literature and Frye’s. It stakes out quite clearly the import of
Derrida’s “ethical turn:” nothing less than a complex, deep, and at times, puzzling rethinking of
man’s relationship with the world and what lies beyond (or behind/beneath) it. The third chapter,
“Archive Trauma,” is partly an exception, in its almost single-minded dedication to just one text,
Derrida’s “Archive Fever.” The narrowness of scope does not translate into depth, however. The
short chapter contains a myriad suggestions and variations on the themes of “trauma” and “archive”
that at times seem to be held together by little more than the virtuosity of the writer. The last
chapter, “Subjectilities,” focusses on a most pointed confrontation: Derrida’s recent positive take on
early Heidegger and, more generally on existentialism, with his rather critical (and now, almost
canonical) interpretations of the 60s and 70s.
The first chapter’s discussion of Derrida’s and Trinh Minh-ha’s relationships to metaphysics sets
the stage for the chapters to come. It announces the crucial concept that runs like a red thread
through the whole constellation of Derrida’s later works, and most particularly in its relationship to
the Western tradition: passivity. This emphasis may come as a surprise to readers mostly acquainted
with Derrida’s earlier work. Deconstruction’s relation to metaphysics, and more specifically to
metaphysical concepts like “freedom,” “agency,” “human essence,” not to speak of “human rights,”
“subject,” etc. was marked by a violent confrontation that employed a strategy of “reversal and
displacement”(10) that has now become canonical. Derrida’s readings of many classical texts (
Plato’s, Freud’s, Hegel’s, Rousseau’s, but also Lévi-Strauss’s and Foucault’s) showed how they
were built around a strategic, hierarchical opposition (like the paradigmatic speech/writing), that
nonetheless contained within itself the seeds of its own undoing. The patient work of the analyst
would show how the opposition could be “reversed.” Speech, for example, was shown to be
derivative upon writing, in the classical analysis of Derrida’s “Signature Event Context”. The very
possibility of establishing a clear-cut distinction was “displaced”: it was shown to be rigorously
untenable and indeed subject to a continuous shift modulated by complex negotiations. The overall
strategy of deconstruction was thus marked by a resolutely “violent” approach to the Western texts
and tradition. Such shock was perhaps most acutely felt in the language and style both of the early
Derrida and especially of his early American followers--later known as the “boa deconstructors.”
The implications of the “reverse and displace” approach are effectively played out in a passage from
Derrida’s “Ends of Man” that Rapaport sums up quite aptly: “the critic stands at once within and
outside of a metaphysical structure and makes it tremble until it ruptures”(11, emph. added).
Trinh Minh-ha's strategy couldn’t be more different; or so it seems. On the one hand, her work
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(Rapaport discusses Woman, Native, Other) makes abundant use of categories that deconstruction
would have thought discredited, or rather “reversed and displaced.” Her account of the villagers
telling stories in the marketplace is narrated with a naive pathos and melodramatic fervor that seem
miles apart form the patient, rigorous analysis of the deconstructionist’s text. Her description of a
primordial, unspoken, and markedly monolingual “house of language” in which the villagers dwell
and which makes the telling and retelling possible, seems ready made for reversal and displacement.
Yet, to remain within the same textual fragment, Minh-ha’s emphasis on the impossibility to
“totalize” a story that “appears bottomless and headless for it is built on differences,” seems to
provide a counterpoint to deconstruction’s accent on the constantly shifting boundaries of meaning
and meaning-producing practices, with its repeated insistence on play, difference, trembling, and so
forth.
Rapaport suggests that Trinh Minh-ha's relationship to deconstruction, her acceptance of its critical
practices along with her simultaneous refusal to reject alternative approaches among which are the
very practices that deconstruction deconstructs, represent a possible alternative development for this
line of thought. “Trinh channels or directs deconstruction--says Rapaport--to a destination to which
it has not been disposed to go.” (10). Trinh Min-ha thus becomes “Deconstruction’s Other.” But
Rapaport’s suggestion would only remain an interesting thought, if it weren’t for the next, crucial
step of his argument: it turns out that later Derrida’s practices and definitions of deconstruction
share some interesting traits with Trinh Minh-ha’s. So much so, that Derrida himself may have
become his own Other.
Rapaport finds a marked continuity in Derrida’s recent emphasis on deconstruction not as a militant
event to be pursued, triggered, and exploited, but as something that happens. The evenementiality
of deconstruction does not belong to a contradictory strategy, to use the terminology of Laclau and
Mouffe exploited by Rapaport. “Deconstruction takes place, --Derrida affirms in the fragment from
the “Letter to a Japanese Friend” Rapaport quotes --it is an event that does not await deliberation,
consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of modernity.” Derrida uses the word “event,”
but the passage makes clear that this “event,” marked by the appropriating event of Heideggerian
origin, is not produced by the subject, the community, or the group. Rather, insofar as it takes
place, it ad-vient, it comes to (us, here), before and beyond the individual’s acts and operations
from which it differs. It is clear that the non act-like event that deconstruction is (or has become), is
quite at odds with the rhetorical apparatus of production, dislocation, breakage, and rupture we
mentioned above. Higher than issues of coherence, though, stand the consequences of this
approach. If “deconstruction deconstructs it-self,” as Derrida proclaims in the quoted text, a radical
opposition to metaphysics and its conceptual apparatus is no longer possible. No real contradiction
(in the classical Hegelo-Marxian sense) can be envisaged between the two because, to a larger
extent, metaphysics and deconstruction inhabit each other. Consequently, the critical attitude--and
all political and ethical stances informed by it-- must be open to a double possibility. First,
deconstructive practices and insights may become one possibility among many, to be freely used
and disposed of in a postmodern work of theoretical collage. Second, among the many elements to
be pasted up on the board, classical conceptions of subjectivity, agency, homeliness/community (i.e.
Gemeinschaft) may once again become first-class citizens. This conclusion sounds disparaging for
the now forgotten radicality of the deconstructive approach, because it oscillates between two
equally unpalatable outcomes. Either deconstruction is one of the many toys to be used in a
postmodern jubilatory game of Nietzschean affirmation (to use Lyotard’s well-known image), in
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which case its value is to be determined on the basis of its strategic relevance to a pre-determined
goal, contra its declared un-actlike or un-operational-like features; or the critical viability of
deconstruction, its disruptive charge, so to speak, must be made dependent, paradoxically enough,
upon the definitive abandonment of the very notion of “critical stance.” A self-deconstructing
deconstruction, to put it differently, reaches its most critical and its most anti-metaphysical point,
when it shows the intrinsic limitations of the conception of critique, and it shifts to a different
paradigm which, as Rapaport suggests, “does not merely recuperate metaphysics as the antithesis to
deconstruction, but, instead, abandons the difference as a kind of ridiculous test or bad dependency”
(22). It may be true, as Rapaport asserts in closing the chapter, that the fact “that metaphysics may
abide in the releasement of deconstruction’s undecidable aporias is not necessarily to be seen as a
victory for metaphysics and a defeat for deconstruction, but as an overcoming or surpassing” of
both (ib.) But what about this “surpassing”? Is it a Heideggerian Verwindung? a Aufhebung? a
relève? The great proximity between Derrida’s later thought and the very same classical models that
it had supposedly displaced comes here to the fore. In other words, the truth of Rapaport’s assertion
about a post-metaphysical appropriation of metaphysics hangs on a more precise articulation of that
“surpassing” and the theoretical horizon that makes its articulation possible. Where to find the clues
toward such horizon?
The abandonment of the classically conceived critical stance, the relinquishment of a contradictory
strategy, the acceptance of a metaphysics that is no longer exclusively such (insofar as it is no
longer the antithesis of its other), the releasement of the intrinsically violent displacing strategy.
Such semantic chain points unequivocally toward the crucial element of Derrida’s later work: a
notion of passivity that inhabits deconstruction and which is less indebted to Heidegger’s
Gelassenheit than to Blanchot’s idea of a radical passivity standing beyond any active/passive
opposition. Indeed, the destiny of deconstruction and its most recent incarnations seems to be
strictly tied to the analysis of the passive relation—to a full articulation of all its participants, its
movement of giving and gifting, its ultimate horizon of praxis.
Since a whole constellation of terms related to passivity inhabits Derrida’s later work (not to speak
of the works of several affine thinkers like Nancy, Blanchot, Lévinas, etc.), one may think the issue
is inexorably vague when stated in these general terms. How many times have we encountered
“hospitality,” “desoeuvrement,” “passion”? To herald the need for a thorough commitment to
passivity in view of an engagement with Derrida’s recent works may seem equivalent to the
tautological affirmation according to which, in order to understand him, we need to read his works.
On the contrary, it must be ascribed to Rapaport’s merit that he clearly indicates the problem’s
historical and theoretical compass. Chronologically, we shall look at the mid-40s-early 50s, the
years following the first wide diffusion of Heidegger’s Being and Time in France that saw its
diverse appropriations, on the unifying background of Hegel’s phenomenology, by Sartre and the
other existentialists, on the one hand, and by Bataille and his associates on the other. Theoretically
speaking, the fundamental issue revolves on the debate about the redefinition of a subject that was
defined on the basis of its capability for action (or its “negating/nihilating” power) and faces the
possibility of its own disappearance when the realm of historical action has come to a closure. To
put it somewhat differently, the theoretical knot lies in the complex debate around existentialism
and its definition of the subject as the subject of (political and ethical) “action.” It may be trivial to
recall that the activity of the subject is inexorably bound to the passivity of the “matter” its actions
will negate and transform. However, the activity/passivity couple thus postulated leaves open the
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possibility that a more radical form of passivity, not dependent upon anyone’s activity, may burst
onto the scene. It could be interpreted as the semi-transcendental horizon of possibility of the
activity/passivity couple, as in Levinas; or as the necessary outcome of the historico- political
situation in which the possibility of historical action has been exhausted (as, in different forms, in
Bataille, Blanchot, and Kojève). In any case, the analysis of passivity must begin with the analysis
of the conditions of possibility of action, and the latter must take its start from the figures and
issues that lie at its origin: Sartre, Heidegger, Bataille, and the likes. Thus, it is not surprising to see
Derrida fully engaged with these themes in his recent writings--although many of his fellow
travelers may be startled, as Rapaport correctly points out, to see him profess such an interest, given
the previous excommunications of existentialism and its contemporary brethren as different forms of
irremediably tainted anthropologism.
It is much to Rapaport’s credit that the last section of his book points in the right direction. Not
only is it mostly devoted to an examination of the Derrida/Heidegger relationship--his analysis
starts from Derrida’s “Ends of Man,” the 1972 essay that engages the whole complex problematic of
action, recognition, and humanism in Sartre and French Hegelianism. He is to be commended as
well for bringing Bataille’s take on existentialism into the debate, since I believe it is fair to say that
most of the post-1960 quarrels, including those in which Derrida participated directly (for example
in “The Ends of Man”) were to a large extent reenactments of the debates between Sartre and the
“other Hegelians” that took place 20 years earlier. One voice, however, is remarkably absent from
the discussion: Kojève’s. Rapaport quotes a crucial passage from an essay in Critique in which
Bataille remarks that Heidegger’s “intense inquiries into l’être negates l’existence and that the
philosophical interest in Being is the intentional ruination of the metaphysics of existence” (109).
Bataille adds that such a metaphysics had been developed with far more reaching radicality by
Hegel. Rapaport fails to note, however, that Bataille’s critique of Heidegger is really Kojève’s. In a
number of texts written between the mid 1930s and the early 60s , including some passages in the
Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, Kojève repeats that if Heidegger’s concern with death brings
him quite close to Hegel, his lack of attention to the negating features of action, i.e. to struggle and
labor (lutte et travail) makes impossible any account of concrete, historically determined existence.
In the unpublished section of a 1936 review to Delp’s Tragische Existenz (recently published by B.
Hesbois and anticipated by D. Auffret in his biography), Kojève (to whom Bataille was quite close
from the late 30s on) repeats the point in words remarkably similar to those of the Critique essay.
Heidegger’s anthropology, he says, “ne peut mener qu’à une ontologie de l’être naturel qui ne
rendrait plus compte des réalités/vérités humaines existentielles que Heidegger voudrait analyser
dans leur être même.” (see D. Auffret, Alexandre Kojève, Paris, Grasset, 1990, p. 384, and Revue
Descartes, 7, 1993 for the complete text).
What is at stake here exceeds, I believe, an academic issue of attributions. Since the end of the
1930s, Bataille and Kojève were engaged in a close debate about the possibilities left open by the
“Hegelian” (but really Kojèvian) end of historical action. Since a human being can only be properly
characterized, for Kojève, by the “struggle and labor” that negates the given natural world and
replaces it with a historical one, the question arises of what happens to human beings if and when
the possibilities for historical action are, as Kojève and his students and friends believed, utterly
exhausted. The issue is how to deal with a situation in which activity, in the strong sense, is no
longer possible. To put it differently, the issue is whether the end of activity will only leave room
for its converse, passivity; whether the end of activity will also mean the end of passivity and the
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discovery of a new praxical horizon that goes beyond it; or again if there is a form of activity that
can be salvaged in the absence of any (natural or historical) material to operate upon; or, finally, if
the end of action can be postponed indefinitely and the natural-historical world will forever provide
human beings with material to be negated and transformed by their struggles and labor. It would be
easy to identify the main actors of the period with all these positions, and some are recalled by
Rapaport himself, although quite obliquely. It may not be useless to recall Kojève’s criticisms,
though. If early Sartre’s never ending dialectics of objectifications is an example of bad infinity that
negates the very conditions of its possibility, because it contradicts the historical dynamics that it is
supposed to instantiate, Bataille’s search for a “negativity without use” (the “negativité sans
emploi” typified by Bataille’s inner experience and its related phenomena of laughter, eroticism,
and play) will necessarily end up in mysticism. As all mystics, Kojève will argue, Bataille will also
end up in silence, or, as he prefers to say, in those forms of self-contradictory discourse which are
so many ways of expressing the Nothing within a community devoted to its custody. Kojève’s
alternative (which articulates itself in many variants over the years) is well-known: the end of action
that will happen when historical possibilities are exhausted will see universally recognized citizens
of the universal state revert to a “passive” condition where everything is “out in the open.” The sage
knows that he knows everything and therefore is perfectly satisfied and can devote himself to
formalist make-believe (snobbery) or innocent games: he can play with the socially constructed
roles and objects because they can no longer be appropriated as tools toward historical action.
The conflict between different understandings of passivity and their correlated social formations (i.e.
Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft) we briefly sketched above, takes center stage in the section of
Rapaport’s book dedicated to a discussion of Derrida’s analysis of monolinguism, literature, and
responsibility. Rapaport starts with a long discussion of Frye’s theory of literature and concludes
that Frye more or less showed that literature is the expression of Gemeinschaft--of that pre-industrial
Gemeinschaft that was already waning in Shakespeare’s times and which is therefore what is most
foreign to us, given that “the world in which we live finds very little resemblance to that in which
myth and, later, literature threw down their roots.” (45) Frye’s monolingual archetypalism seems
quite an odd bedfellow for Derrida, long heralded as the prophet of difference and deferral. Yet
Rapaport’s analysis of recent Derridean texts shows that if one could certainly read the early attacks
on voice, speech, etc., as many attacks on monolinguism, it is indeed “to some form of
Gemeinschaft that Derrida would return to from the hither side of deconstruction” (53). For Derrida,
literature may not be the collection of archetypes so dear to Frye, but it becomes the setting up of a
mise-en-scène in which the same logic is always repeated: “the giving of the gift that reveals the
undecidable and incalculable relation/nonrelation of donor and recipient” (ib.). Literature, to put it
somewhat crudely, is a form of passion in the religious sense, i.e. “what sets a person apart and
makes the person exceptional as the precondition for returning and rededicating oneself to others“
(54) by the giving of the testimony. It is a response, however, that will always leave something out.
In literature, Derrida will more or less say, “il y a du secret,’ Or better: literature is the “il y a là du
secret,” the mise-en-scène that allows “le secret” to play itself out. Thus Gemeinschaft and
monolinguism return--not as the universal language of Frye’s archetypal-universal- pre-medieval
community, but as a plurality of such communities. Rapaport concludes that “we cannot simply
reject monolinguism outright for political reasons having to do with diversity, because the
monolinguism operates, in any case, where testimony is given or works of arts are advanced, since
they obey a law of exceptionality. Moreover, it is the monolingual moment that in its exceptionality
(its otherness) requires one to make a decision on committing to a community or not on the basis of
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some kind of faith” (73). No matter how fascinating Rapaport’s articulation of Derrida’s return to
monolinguism “from the hither side of deconstruction” is, one wonders if there isn’t a strong sense
of déjà vu to the whole, and indeed quite complex theoretical dynamic. Derrida’s deconstructive
monolinguism, and his accents on community/Gemeinschaft, presents so many similarities to
Bataille’s position that one may be tempted to ask if Kojève’s critical point about its necessarily
mystic (and therefore silent) outcomes are not applicable to Derrida as well. With the difference,
perhaps, that instead of Bataille’s unilateral mysticism we are now presented with a mystical merry-
go-round where we all take turns, our separate communities and with a logic and timeliness of our
own, at playing (silent) witnessing-mystic and revealing-concealing God.
Be it as it may, it seems to me that the major impasse of Rapaport’s discussion is to avoid raising
this issue. To be fair, the situation really reflects an impasse (or a lack of engagement) in Derrida’s
later thought: the lack of an extended confrontation with the extreme “Hegelianism” that had been
the necessary counterpart to so many of Derrida’s inspirers, from Bataille, to Blanchot, to Levinas
and that is still at work, often unrecognized, in so many strands of French contemporary thought.
To conclude, this rich book by Rapaport, by engaging directly some of the thorny issues raised by
Derrida’s ethical turn, makes a welcome addition to the contemporary philosophical debate and will
certainly stimulate reflection in many readers, as it did with the present reviewer.
Stefano Franchi
The University of Auckland
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